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Studies of emotion processing in autism have produced mixed results, with fewer 
studies observing autism-specific deficits than might be imagined.  In the current 
study, 21 individuals with autism and 21 age- and ability-matched, learning disabled 
comparison participants were tested for their ability to (a) recognise, in others, 
expressions of “social” emotions (e.g., embarrassment) and “non-social” emotions 
(e.g., happiness) and; (b) report their own previous experiences of each of these 
emotions.   
In line with predictions, amongst both groups of participants, social emotions 
were more difficult to recognise and report than non-social emotions.  Also amongst 
both groups, the ability to report social emotion-experience was significantly 
associated with the ability to recognise social emotions in others, independent of age 
and verbal ability.  However, contrary to predictions, there were no group differences 
in the levels or patterns of performance amongst participants with autism and 
comparison participants.    
In light of previous research, these results suggest either that emotion-
processing is not as specifically impaired in autism as is traditionally thought to be the 
case, or that individuals with autism are implementing compensatory strategies to 
succeed on experimental tasks in the absence of emotion-processing competence. 
 
Keywords: Autism Spectrum Disorder, Emotion Processing, Self-Awareness, Self-
Conscious Emotion, Social Emotion. 




Reports of emotion processing deficits amongst people with autism are not hard to 
find, either from individuals with autism themselves (e.g., Grandin, 1996), or from 
their caregivers, or clinicians (e.g., Kanner, 1943; Hobson et al., 2006).  Indeed, 
deficits in emotion processing form part of the diagnostic criteria of autism according 
to major classification systems (e.g., American Psychiatric Association, 2000) as well 
as ‘gold standard’ assessment tools (e.g., Lord et al., 2000).   However, when 
considering the results of well-controlled empirical studies, evidence of autism-
specific deficits in recognizing emotions in others, or describing emotions in self, is 
mixed.   
When considering the literature on emotion processing in autism, one 
important factor to bear in mind regards the type of emotion under consideration.  For 
many emotion theorists, ‘social’ or ‘self-conscious’ emotions, such as embarrassment, 
pride, and guilt are a special class of emotion, separate from ‘basic’ emotions, such as 
fear, happiness, and sadness (e.g., Levenson, 1999).  Although all emotions could be 
considered ‘social’ in the most basic sense, emotions like pride, shame, 
embarrassment, and guilt are assumed to be at least partly culturally constructed and 
dependent for their emergence on social-affective/social-cognitive capacities, 
including basic self-other differentiation and the ability to register the perspectives of 
others on oneself (e.g., Lewis, 2003; Tracy & Robins, 2004).  In contrast, basic 
emotions are widely assumed to emerge early in development and have a biological 
(innate) basis (e.g., Izard, 1971).  Given both the diagnostic difficulties with social 
interaction and communication experienced by individuals with autism and the 
uniquely interpersonal nature and origins of social emotions, it seems likely that this 
type of emotion will prove more difficult for people with autism to register in others 
or understand in themselves than other, non-social emotions.   
In keeping with this suggestion, high-functioning individuals with autism 
(HFA), who do not have intellectual impairment (i.e., IQs > 70), appear relatively 
unimpaired in their ability to recognise expressions of non-social emotions in the 
faces of photographed actors (e.g., Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2003; Rutherford & 
Towns, 2008; van der Geest, Kemner, Verbaten, & Engeland, 2002; Wright et al., 
2008; for alternative explanations and findings see e.g., Grossman, Klin, Carter, & 
Volkmar, 2000; Hobson, 1991; Wallace, Coleman, & Bailey, 2008).   Amongst low-
functioning individuals with autism (LFA), who do have accompanying learning 
disability (i.e., have IQs of 70 or below), there is greater evidence of deficits in the 
recognition of non-social emotions (e.g., Braverman et al., 1989; Hobson, 1982, 
1986).  However, even here differences between groups are observed usually when 
LFA participants are matched with non-autistic comparison participants only for non-
verbal ability, and not when groups are matched for verbal skills (e.g., Ozonoff et al., 
1990). 
In keeping with the idea that difficulties in understanding social emotions 
should be particularly pronounced amongst people with autism, Heerey, Keltner and 
Capps (2003) found that even high-functioning children with autism were 
significantly less able than age- and verbal ability-matched comparison participants to 
identify expressions of embarrassment and shame in photographed actors.  On the 
other hand, no group differences were observed in the recognition of non-social 
emotions, including ‘complex’, non-basic emotions such as surprise (contra Baron-
Cohen, 1993).    
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In a similar vein, Losh and Capps (2006) found that high-functioning children 
with autism were as able as age- and verbal ability-matched comparison children to 
describe their previous experiences of non-social emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, 
disappointment, surprise).  However, when it came to describing their previous 
experiences of social emotions (pride, embarrassment, guilt, shame), participants with 
autism produced narratives that were significantly less contextually appropriate and 
coherent than those produced by comparison participants.  These results replicate and 
extend those of Capps, Yirmiya, and Sigman (1992) who also found no qualitative 
differences between the self-reported experiences of happiness and sadness provided 
by children with and without autism, but found the descriptions of embarrassing 
situations provided by high-functioning children with autism significantly less 
appropriate than those provided by matched comparison participants.   
Although this recent literature potentially provides a clearer picture of 
emotion-processing deficits in autism, other empirical evidence casts doubt even on 
the claim that individuals with autism show impaired comprehension of social 
emotions.  Hillier and Allinson (2002), for example, presented relatively high-
functioning individuals with autism (with mean verbal IQs of approximately 80), as 
well as age- and verbal ability-matched comparison participants, with a series of 
written scenarios involving potentially embarrassing situations.   No significant 
differences between these two groups were observed in terms of either the overall 
degree of embarrassment attributed to the protagonist in each scenario, or in terms of 
the quality of explanation provided for these attributions.   
More recently, Hobson et al. (2006) conducted a thorough investigation of 
social-emotion processing in low-functioning children with autism.  Although in-
depth parental interviews suggested that participants with autism manifested limited 
expression or understanding of social emotions in their everyday lives, participants’ 
performance on experimental tasks provided little evidence that they did not grasp the 
nature of these emotions.  Contrary to the authors’ expectations, children with autism 
were as able as age- and verbal ability-matched comparison participants to (a) 
recognise expressions of pride, guilt, and shame/embarrassment in the videotaped 
(and photographed) expressions of actors; and (b) describe their own previous 
experiences of pride and guilt.   
Although the sample sizes in the studies by Hillier and Allinson (2002), and 
Hobson et al. (2006) were relatively small (n = 10 per group and 12 per group, 
respectively), it is striking that even low-function children (in the latter study) did not 
display clear deficits in their recognition/understanding of social emotions.   In their 
Monograph, Hobson et al. provide a thought-provoking discussion of the structure of 
social emotions, arguing that whilst typical individuals arrive at their understanding of 
such emotions through their experience of early interpersonal relations, individuals 
with autism may acquire their knowledge through an alternative, compensatory route 
(see below for further discussion).   
The aim of the current investigation was to explore not only the extent to 
which children with autism grasp the nature of social emotions, but also to provide 
some preliminary evidence with regard to the basis of this understanding.  If, as we 
agree with Hobson et al. (2006) is the case, social emotions are typically grounded in 
reciprocal social exchanges, and later conceptualised as such, then the ability to 
describe one’s own experiences of social emotions should be significantly associated 
with the ability to recognise instances of such emotion-experience in others.  
Certainly, there is evidence from investigations of typical theory of mind development 
that the ability to recognise others’ mental states is closely associated with the ability 
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to report mental states in self (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  However, if 
one’s understanding of social emotions (or mental states) is only superficial, based on 
a kind of rule-bound cognitively-acquired heuristic (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1985), 
then there is no a priori reason to suppose that a close link between self- and other-
understanding will exist (see Williams & Happé, in press; Williams, Lind, & Happé, 
in press).  This may be the case amongst people with autism, if they possess only a 
cursory grasp of social emotions.   
The current study was conducted in order to explore this set of issues.  
Following Losh and Capps’ (2006) method, participants were asked to define and 
then describe previous experiences of social (pride, guilt, and embarrassment) and 
non-social (happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, disgust, and disappointment) emotions.  
Following this aspect of the study, participants were shown a series of standard video 
clips, each depicting an actor expressing one of these emotions.  Participants were 
asked to identify the emotion expressed in each clip.  It was predicted that participants 
with autism would be impaired in their capacity to report (in self) and recognise (in 
others) social emotions, but not non-social emotions.  Amongst comparison 
participants, it was predicted that the ability to describe experiences of social 
emotions would be significantly associated with the ability to recognise social 
emotions.  Amongst participants with autism, on the other hand, it was predicted that 
these abilities would not be significantly related, reflecting the use of task-specific 






Ethical approval for this research was obtained from the appropriate Research Ethics 
Committee.  Twenty-one children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and 21 
comparison children completed the emotion recognition aspect of the experiment, 
after parents/guardians had given written, informed consent for their children to be 
included.  The participants in the ASD group had received formal diagnoses, by a 
trained psychiatrist or pediatrician, of autistic disorder (n = 18), Asperger’s disorder 
(n = 2) or atypical autism/pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified 
(PDD-NOS; n = 1) according to established criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000).  All participants in this group attended specialist autism schools, 
which required a diagnosis of autism, Asperger’s syndrome or PDD-NOS for entry 
into the school.  The comparison group consisted of children with general learning 
disability of unknown origin who attended schools for children with developmental 




Baseline verbal and non-verbal abilities were assessed using an appropriate measure 
for the developmental level of each participant.  The verbal abilities of 15/21  children 
with ASD and 15/21 comparison children were assessed using the Vocabulary and 
Information subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition 
(WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991).  The verbal IQ estimate gained from this short form has 
high reliability (Sattler, 1992).  Because the lowest test age-equivalent offered by the 
WISC-III is 6 years 2 months, the verbal mental age (VMA) of any participant who 
fell below this level on either of the verbal subtests could not be calculated.  Under 
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these circumstances, participants were administered the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale – Second Edition (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997), which offers test age-equivalents 
down to 2 years 11 months.  The verbal abilities of 6/21 children with ASD and 6/21 
comparison children were assessed with the BPVS.   
The non-verbal abilities of all participants were assessed using the Block 
Design and Picture Completion subtests of the WISC-III.  Due to limited child 
availability, the non-verbal abilities of one participant with ASD and one comparison 
participant were not assessed
1
.  Participant characteristics for the total sample of ASD 
and comparison participants are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Given that some ASD and comparison participants received the Wechsler Scales 
(Wechsler, 1991), whilst others received the BPVS (Dunn et al., 1997), independent t-
tests were conducted comparing ASD and comparison participants from each sub-
sample to ensure adequacy of matching in each case, as well as overall.  ASD and 
comparison participants who received the WISC-III were well matched on all 
variables (all ts < 0.40, all ps > .69), as were ASD and comparison participants who 
received the BPVS (all ts < 0.53, all ps > .61). 
Three children with ASD did not have data for the emotion reporting aspect of 
the experiment.  The remaining groups (of 18 children with ASD and 21 comparison 
participants) were still well matched for this aspect of the study (all ts < - 0.71, all ps 
> .48). 
 
Design and Procedures 
 




Reporting emotion experiences in self 
 
Participants were asked two questions about each emotion, in a fixed order.  Firstly, 
participants were asked to define the emotion in question (e.g., “What does ‘proud’ 
mean?”) and their response was noted by the experimenter.  Regardless of the quality 
of the participant’s definition, the experimenter always subsequently offered a 
standard definition, based on situations in which people would typically experience 
the emotion.  For the emotion ‘pride’, for example, the experimenter would say, 
‘Well, I think people feel proud when they have done something really well, much 
better than they or other people thought they would do’.  The definitions offered by 
participants for each emotion were rated as either correct or incorrect.  For example, a 
correct definition of ‘pride’ had to contain reference to ‘some positive act under the 
control of the individual which was either explicitly or implicitly relative to some 
standard’. 
Having defined the emotion in question, the participant was then asked to 
report a time in their lives when they had experienced the emotion.  Their report was 
noted, verbatim, by the experimenter.  The types of emotion were presented in the 
following fixed order with social and non-social emotions interspersed: sadness, 
pride, disappointment, fear, embarrassment, surprise, happiness, guilt and disgust. 
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 Following previous studies of emotion processing amongst typically and 
atypically developing children (e.g., Capps et al., 1992; Losh & Capps, 2006), self-
reported experiences of each emotion were rated for the degree to which they 
involved contextually suitable situations.  Each report was rated on a scale of 0 to 2.  
A score of 2 was assigned to reports that unambiguously described situations which 
were appropriate for eliciting the emotion in question (e.g., “I felt proud when I won 
the 100 metres race at school”; “I felt embarrassed when I fell over and everyone 
laughed at me”).  A score of 1 was assigned to reports that described events which 
would not typically elicit the emotion in question, but which might usually elicit a 
feeling with a similar hedonic tone (e.g., “I felt disappointed when my grandma 
died”).  Finally, a score of zero was assigned to reports that described events which 
would not have elicited the emotion in question (e.g., “I felt disgusted when I went to 
the park and played on the swings”; “I felt guilty when I did my homework”), or 
when participants offered no response.   
 The first author of this paper rated each transcript in the first instance.  A 
second rater, who was blind to participant diagnoses and the hypotheses of the study, 
independently rated 6/39 (15%) transcripts.  Inter-rater reliability was high for both 
the correctness of emotion definitions ( = .76) and the quality of emotion reports ( 
= .80) (see Cohen, 1992). 
 
Recognition of emotions in others. 
 
Stimuli for the recognition task were nine silent, five-second video clips each of an 
actor expressing a different emotion.  Stimuli were taken from ‘Mind Reading: An 
Interactive Guide to Emotions’ (Baron-Cohen, 2004), which provides standard 
expressions of each of the emotions.  Participants watched the nine clips in turn and, 
after each, stated what emotion they believed was expressed by the actor.   
Given concerns about forced-choice response methods (Haidt & Keltner, 
1999), and following Heerey et al. (2003), a partly-free response method was adopted 
such that children could either spontaneously generate a word to describe the emotion 
expressed by each actor, or choose a word from a list of six emotion terms.  A 
different list was provided for each of the nine emotions, and each list consisted of the 
target emotion plus five distractor emotion terms from the study.  
Before beginning the task, it was established that the participant could read 
each of the emotion words. Four participants (two with ASD and two comparison 
participants, each with a VMA under 6 years) were unable to read the words on the 
list.  For these participants, the experimenter read out each of the six words on each 
list after the video clip had been viewed.   
Each clip was presented in the bottom left-hand corner of a standard laptop in 
a window approximately 10  10 cm in size.  Each accompanying list of words was 
presented on-screen in Times New Roman font, 20 point, alongside the clip.  Clips 
were presented in the following fixed order: happiness, guilt, surprise, sadness, pride, 




Reporting Emotion Experiences in Self 
 
Firstly, a series of chi-square analyses was conducted to compare the number of 
participants from each diagnostic group correctly defining each of the nine emotions.  
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These analyses yielded no significant differences between the groups (all ²s < 1.82, 
all ps > .24).  Both groups of participants appeared quite proficient at spontaneously 
defining each emotion.  Figure 1 shows the percentage of participants from each 
diagnostic group correctly defining each emotion. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Next, points were tallied for participants’ reports of each type of emotion experience, 
yielding scores of 0-12 for the six non-social emotions and 0-6 for the three social 
emotions.  Because each type of emotion contained a different number of exemplars, 
overall percentage scores were calculated for each type of emotion for the purpose of 
comparison.  Table 2 shows the mean percentage scores awarded for reports of social 
and non-social emotion experiences amongst ASD and comparison participants. 
Data were analysed using a 2  2 repeated-measures ANOVA, with diagnostic 
group (ASD/comparison) as the between-participants factor and emotion-type 
(social/non-social) as the within-participants variable.  This ANOVA yielded a 
significant main effect of condition, reflecting the fact that participants’ reports of 
non-social emotions were significantly superior to their descriptions of social 
emotions, F(1, 37) = 26.82, p < .001, r = .65.    The main effect of diagnostic group 
was not significant, indicating that, overall, the reports of emotion experiences offered 
by participants with ASD were not significantly different in quality from those offered 
by comparison participants, F(1, 37) = 0.99, p = .76, r = .16.  There was no significant 
interaction between emotion-type and diagnostic group, indicating that participants 
with ASD showed the same pattern of performance across emotion-types as 
comparison participants, F(1, 37) = 2.67, p = .11, r = .26.   
  
Table 2 here 
 
Finally, a series of Mann-Whitney tests was conducted, comparing the quality of self-
reports (on a scale of 0 to 2 points) of each emotion, independently, amongst ASD 
and comparison participants.  These analyses revealed that participants with ASD 
described their own feelings of disappointment significantly less well than 
comparison participants, U = 107.00, p = .007, r = .44.  However, this post hoc 
comparison did not remain significant after a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons had been applied.  No other differences were significant (all Us > 
155.00, all ps > .34).  Figure 2 shows the mean score for each of the nine reports of 
emotion experiences, by ASD and comparison participants.  Also, a representative set 
of participants’ self-reports of social emotions is included in Appendix 1.  This serves 
to illustrate how similar the descriptions offered by ASD and comparison participants 
were, and how difficult it would be to distinguish the two groups on the basis of 
emotion reports. 
 
  Figure 2 here 
 
Relationship between VMA and quality of self-reports 
 
Amongst comparison participants, VMA was not significantly associated with the 
quality of reports of social (r = .19, p = .42) or non-social (r = .15, p = .51) emotion 
experiences.  In contrast, amongst participants with ASD, VMA was significantly 
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correlated with reports of both social (r = .66, p = .003) and non-social (r = .65, p = 
.004) emotion experiences.   
 
Recognition of Emotion in Others 
 
One point was given for each emotion correctly identified and then points were tallied 
for each type of emotion, yielding scores of 0-6 for non-social emotions and 0-3 for 
social emotions.  Again, for the purposes of comparison, percentage scores were 
calculated for each type of emotion.  Table 3 shows the percentage of social and non-
social emotions correctly recognised by ASD and comparison participants.   
 
Table 3 here 
 
Data were analysed using a 2  2 repeated-measures ANOVA, with diagnostic group 
(ASD/comparison) as the between-participants factor and emotion type (social/non-
social) as the within-participants variable.  This ANOVA yielded a significant main 
effect of condition, reflecting the fact that participants recognised non-social emotions 
significantly more reliably than they recognised social emotions, F(1, 40) = 86.66, p < 
.001, r = .83.  The main effect of diagnostic group was not significant, indicating that, 
overall, participants with ASD showed the same level of recognition as comparison 
participants, F(1, 40) = 0.21, p = .65, r = .07.  The interaction between condition and 
diagnostic group was not significant indicating that participants with ASD showed the 
same pattern of recognition performance, across emotion-types, as comparison 
participants, F(1, 40) = 0.72, p = .40, r = .13. 
 Finally, a series of chi-square analyses did not reveal significant differences in 
the numbers of participants from each diagnostic group correctly recognising each of 
the nine emotions, individually, all ²s < 4.29, all ps > .10.  Figure 3 shows the 
percentage of ASD and comparison participants correctly recognising each emotion. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Relationship between VMA and emotion recognition 
 
Amongst participants with ASD, VMA was not significantly related to the recognition 
of social or non-social emotions, all rs < .12, all ps > .62.  Amongst comparison 
participants, VMA was significantly correlated with the ability to recognise non-
social emotions, r = .56, p = .008, but not social emotions, r = .32, p = .16.   
 
Relation Between Describing Emotions in Self and Recognising Them in Others 
 
A series of partial correlation analyses, controlling for chronological age and VMA, 
was performed in order to assess the relationship between reporting emotions in self 
and recognising them in others.  Given that there were no between-group differences 
in the ability to report emotion experiences, or to recognise emotions in others, the 
groups were collapsed, in the first instance, to increase the power of the analysis.   
When both diagnostic groups were collapsed, only the following partial 
correlations were significant (all other ps > .12): recognising social emotions  
reporting social emotions (r = .46, p = .004), and recognising non-social emotions  
reporting non-social emotions (r = .37, p = .03).  However, only the correlation 
between recognising social emotions in others and reporting social emotions in self 
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remained significant after Bonferroni adjustments for multiple comparisons had been 
applied.    
 When partial correlations were performed within each group separately, the 
correlation between recognising social emotions in others and describing social 
emotions in self was significant amongst both participants with ASD (r = .70, p = 
.003) and comparison participants (r = .47, p = .04).  The significant positive 
correlation between recognising social emotions in others and describing social 
emotions in self was not predicted amongst participants with ASD.  However, this 




The results of this study were remarkably clear, although somewhat contrary to our 
hypotheses.  Most importantly, children with autism (with average verbal IQs of just 
above 70 and average performance IQs of just under 70) were as able as age- and 
ability-matched comparison participants to recognise ‘social’ and ‘non-social’ 
emotions in others, and to describe their own previous experiences of these emotions.  
Although equivalent levels of performance between the groups were expected with 
regard to the recognition/reoprting of non-social emotions, such similar levels of 
understanding of social emotions between the groups were not predicted.   
Although this result runs counter to those of some previous studies (Capps et 
al., 1992; Heerey et al., 2003; Losh & Capps, 2006), it is important to note that this is 
not the first study to find children with autism unimpaired at recognising/reporting 
social emotions.  For instance, our results closely match those of Hobson et al. (2006), 
who explored social emotion understanding amongst low-functioning children with 
autism, and Hillier and Allinson (2002) who explored understanding of 
embarrassment amongst high-functioning children.   
On the one hand, it is possible that the lack of between-group differences 
observed in the current study was due to the use of a potentially insensitive 
methodology, which failed to detect (perhaps subtle) deficits amongst participants 
with autism.  On the other hand, in neither the emotion recognition nor emotion 
description aspects of the study did participants display ceiling levels of performance.  
As such, the tasks were not merely too simple for participants.   
Another possible reason why group differences in emotion processing abilities 
were not observed in the current study might be due to the characteristics of the 
participant samples employed.  Perhaps deficits in emotion processing are clearer in 
younger and/or less able individuals with autism than employed in the current study.  
However, the fact that some studies have found emotion processing deficits in older 
and more able individuals with autism than participants in this study (e.g., Losh & 
Capps, 2006), whereas other studies have failed to find deficits in younger/less able 
children (e.g., Hobson et al., 2006), suggests that the age/ability-level of the 
participants is not the critical factor in determining whether statistically significant 
group differences are observed.   
As noted above, it is surprising how inconsistent the findings of experimental 
studies of emotion processing in autism have been.  As Hobson et al. (2006, p.37) 
note, this surprise is mainly “because there is a perplexing gap between what children 
[with autism] show in their daily lives, and what they seem able to formulate in 
words”.   A possibility raised by several researchers (e.g., Hermelin & O’Connor, 
1985), including Hobson et al., is that affected children’s understanding of emotions, 
as it is tapped by experimental measures, is only superficial, and that successful 
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performance on such measures is the result of compensatory (possibly task-specific) 
strategies.  Some studies have found evidence which suggests that performance on 
emotion recognition tasks is uniquely supported by verbal intelligence amongst 
individuals with autism (e.g., Grossman et al., 2000).  In the current study, however, 
verbal IQ was not significantly associated with the ability to recognise either social or 
non-social emotions amongst participants with autism (although verbal IQ was 
uniquely related to the ability to describe previous emotion experiences amongst these 
participants).  
Perhaps more suggestive that task-specific, compensatory strategies were not 
being used by participants with ASD in the current study was the finding that amongst 
both groups of participants there was a significant (and substantial) correlation 
between the ability to recognise social emotions in others and describe experiences of 
one’s own social emotions.  Whatever underlying cognitive process was responsible 
for successful recognition of these emotions was apparently also responsible for the 
ability to understand these emotions in self.  It has been argued from philosophical 
(e.g., Strawson, 1962) and psychological (e.g., Hobson, 1990) perspectives that 
concepts of self, including one’s own emotions, and others are fundamentally 
intertwined.   The positive correlations between recognising and describing social 
emotions may, therefore, suggest that underlying concepts of these emotions, rather 
than compensatory strategies, are driving successful task performance amongst both 
participant groups.  On the other hand, it is possible that amongst one or both groups 
this significant correlation was the result of the same compensatory strategy being 
employed to mediate both experimental tasks.  Whilst this possibility cannot be 
entirely ruled out, the current results do not provide any support for the suggestion 
that task-specific strategies are used by children with ASD to mediate emotion 
processing tasks.   
 
   
 




To ensure that the groups would still be matched for performance IQ we arbitrarily 
assigned the outstanding ASD participant with the maximum possible performance IQ 
score (140 points) and the outstanding comparison participant with the minimum 
possible performance IQ score (45 points).  A re-analysis of the data confirmed that 
the groups would still have been well matched under these conditions, t(40) = 0.75, p 












2 point descriptions: 
“…I sang a song very well at a disco and everybody cheered and I felt proud” (ASD 
participant; CA = 12.42, VMA = 10.83). 
“When I won a shield for the Governor’s award for improved behaviour” (comparison 
participant; CA = 12.00, VMA = 10.33). 
 
1 point descriptions: 
“When I ride on big bikes” (ASD participant; CA = 7.42, VMA = 4.33) 
“When I did my merits properly” (comparison participant; CA = 14.00, VMA = 6.58). 
 
0 point descriptions: 
“When I got a DVD” (ASD participant, CA = 12.42; VMA = 6.67). 
“When my Dad let me watch this film without asking” (comparison participant; CA = 




2 point descriptions: 
“When I was going home from school I accidentally spilled some water on my 
trousers and people saw it and they laughed at me and they asked if I’d wet myself” 
(ASD participant; CA = 15.75, VMA = 11.83). 
“When I first came to this school and when I’ve been on stage acting in assemblies” 
(comparison participant; CA = 12.00, VMA = 10.33). 
 
1 point descriptions: 
“I did something silly.  I forgot to do my homework” (ASD participant; CA = 9.08, 
VMA = 7.83). 
“I was outside playing and then someone came up to me and they said ‘hey what you 
doing?’” (comparison participant; CA = 10.42, VMA = 6.67). 
 
0 point descriptions: 
“I jump up and down” (ASD participant; CA = 12.08, VMA = 8.00). 
“I’ve been embarrassed of my brother when I ask him to buy us something and he 




2 point descriptions: 
“When I done something bad yesterday – I bit my Mum” (ASD participant; CA = 
12.08, VMA = 8.00). 
“When I told my friend she could stay, but I let somebody else stay” (comparison 
participant; CA = 14.32, VMA = 7.50). 
 
1 point descriptions: 
(all participants with ASD scored either 0 or 2 points)  
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 “When I was little and I was grounded” (comparison participant; CA = 14.25, VMA 
= 9.33). 
 
0 point descriptions: 
“No, I’m not guilty” (ASD participant; CA = 13.08, VMA = 6.67). 
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Table 1: Participant characteristics: Means and (standard deviations) 
 ASD Comparison t p Effect 
size (r) 
n 21 21    
CA: years 12.35 (2.26) 12.59 (1.94) -0.37 .72 .06 
     
VMA: years 8.42 (2.24) 8.31 (1.97) 0.17 .87 .03 
     
VIQ 73.24 (13.77) 69.33 (11.26) 1.01 .32 .16 
     
PIQ
a
 67.10 (18.63) 66.60 (18.68) 0.85 .93 .14 
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Table 2: Mean (SD) percentage scores for reports of social and non-social emotion 
experiences by ASD and comparison participants. 





(n = 18) 
69.91 (25.10) 54.63 (35.15) 
Comparison 
(n = 21) 
79.37 (13.84) 50.00 (31.62) 
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Table 3: Mean (SD) percentage of non-social and social emotions correctly 
recognised by ASD and comparison participants. 





(n = 18) 
76.98 (23.85) 41.27 (29.64) 
Comparison 
(n = 21) 









Figure 1: Percentage of ASD and comparison participants correctly defining each 
emotion. 
 
Figure 2: Mean scores (out of 2) for each of the nine emotion descriptions by ASD 
and comparison participants.  Error bars represent one SE of the mean. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of ASD and comparison participants correctly recognising each 
emotion. 
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